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 Doing Without Believing 
Intellectualism, Knowledge-How, and Belief-Attribution 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We consider a range of  cases—both hypothetical and actual—in which agents apparently 
know how to φ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact φ is a way for them to φ.  These 
“no-belief ” cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how.  The problem 
is this: if  knowledge-that entails belief, and if  knowing how to φ just is knowing that some w is a way 
for one to φ, then an agent cannot both know how to φ and fail to believe that w, the way that she φs, 
is a way for her to φ.  We discuss a variety of  ways in which Intellectualists might respond to this 
challenge and argue that, ultimately, this debate converges with another, seemingly distinct debate in 
contemporary epistemology: how to attribute belief  in cases of  conflict between an agent’s avowals 
and her behavior.  No-belief  cases, we argue, reveal how Intellectualism depends on the plausibility 
of  positing something like “implicit beliefs”—which conflict with an agent’s avowed beliefs—in many 
cases of  apparent knowledge-how.  While there may be good reason to posit implicit beliefs elsewhere, 
we suggest that there are at least some grounds for thinking that these reasons fail to carry over to 
no-belief  cases, thus applying new pressure to Intellectualism. 
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1. Introduction 
Philosophy has seen a resurgence of  interest in the nature of  knowledge-how, and in particular 
regarding whether knowledge-how is ultimately reducible to a sort of  knowledge-that or propositional 
knowledge.  The terms of  this debate have remained relatively stable since Stanley & Williamson 
(2001) revived interest in it.  Most work has centered on three kinds of  arguments: (1) attempts to 
show that one or another theory is incompatible with either the syntax or semantics of  English or 
other natural languages;1 (2) surveys of  folk judgments;2 and (3) appeals to intuitions about cases both 
real and imagined.3  Here, we will focus on this third set of  arguments.  In particular, we are interested 
in what we call “no-belief ” cases, in which agents appear to exhibit knowledge-how even though they 
                                                 
1 Stanley & Williamson, 2001; Rumfitt, 2003; Stanley, 2011b; [reference removed]. 
2 Bengson et al., 2009. 
3 Stanley & Williamson, 2001; Hawley 2003; Bengson & Moffett, 2007; Wallis 2008; Cath, 2011.  These cases are mostly 
hypothetical, but see §3 for discussion of  an exception, Wallis (2008), who appeals to real-world cases. 
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seem to actively disbelieve that the way in which they in fact φ is a way for them to φ.  These cases 
present a prima facie challenge to Intellectualism about knowledge-how, the canonical version of  which 
we take to be given by the thesis that knowing how to φ just is knowing that some way w is a way for 
one to φ (Stanley & Williamson, 2001; Stanley, 2011a,b).  The problem is this: if  knowledge-that entails 
belief, and if  knowing how to φ just is knowing that w is a way for one to φ, then an agent cannot both 
know how to φ and fail to believe that w, the way that she actually φs, is a way for her to φ.  And yet, 
the no-belief  cases we will present appear to be precisely cases in which an agent knows how to φ 
while failing to believe that w, the way that she actually φs, is a way for her to φ. 
After discussing background issues, we consider the no-belief  cases that have already been 
introduced to support Anti-Intellectualism, together with some Intellectualist replies.  While we take 
these replies to be mostly successful, they fail to home in on the key issue.  We therefore introduce a 
new set of  no-belief  cases, involving skilled motor action, which have been extensively investigated 
in psychology and resist the Intellectualist replies mentioned above.  More importantly, these new 
cases focus our attention on what we take to be the central question: how to attribute beliefs in 
situations where an agent explicitly reports believing P, but her behavior suggests that she does not 
believe P?  There has been considerable debate on this question elsewhere in epistemology, and some 
have argued that cases of  apparent belief-behavior conflict can be explained by positing action-guiding 
“implicit” beliefs—or, roughly, non-conscious beliefs to which agents typically or paradigmatically 
lack introspective access.4  Our aim will be to clarify the relationship between these two debates, that 
is, the debate about knowledge-how and the debate about belief-behavior conflict.  Until now, these 
debates have progressed largely in isolation from each other.5  We argue, in particular, that ostensible 
no-belief  cases reveal how Intellectualism depends on the plausibility of  positing something like 
implicit beliefs in many cases of  apparent knowledge-how.  We conclude by offering reasons why 
positing implicit beliefs in these cases is unlikely to succeed, even if  it is a viable strategy in other cases.  
Finally, we discuss the ramifications of  this suggestion for a broader set of  questions about the 
relationship between practical and theoretical knowledge. 
  
2. Intellectualism, Anti-Intellectualism, and Belief 
Ryle (1949) famously argued in favor of  the claim that knowledge-how is irreducible to 
knowledge-that.  This view we call Anti-Intellectualism.  Ryle’s main argument for this view was that 
to deny it would lead to a vicious regress: suppose that knowing how to φ is to be explained in terms 
of  contemplating a proposition P1.  Contemplating P1 is itself  an act that can be done intelligently or 
                                                 
4 We discuss what putative implicit beliefs are in §5.2.  For discussion of  apparent belief-behavior conflict, see Peacocke, 
1999, 2004; Rowbottom, 2007; Zimmerman, 2007; Egan, 2008, 2011; Gendler, 2008a,b; Schwitzgebel, 2010; Gertler, 2011; 
Mandelbaum, 2011, 2014; Madva, 2012, ms; and [reference removed].  Note that for reasons of  exposition we distinguish 
an agent’s explicit avowals from her behavior, even though we recognize that an avowal is ultimately a form of  verbal 
behavior. 
5 A possible exception is found in the work of  Hubert Dreyfus.  He argues both that skilled action is a form of  knowledge-
how that is irreducible to propositional knowledge and that agents who are in the “flow” of  action have no occurrent 
beliefs about what they are doing.  We discuss Dreyfus’ arguments in §4. 
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not.  Thus, intelligently contemplating P1 requires knowing how to contemplate P1.  That, in turn, will 
require contemplating P2, and so on.  While not all contemporary Anti-Intellectualists are motivated 
by Ryle’s regress, and some have presented alternative interpretations of  his arguments, they are united 
in claiming that knowledge-how is irreducible to knowledge-that.6   
 Most Intellectualists deny the force of  Ryle’s regress, thus rejecting what was long taken to be 
the most powerful argument against Intellectualism.7  Several versions of  Intellectualism have recently 
emerged, but a central tenet of  virtually any version of  Intellectualism is that knowing how to φ just is 
knowing that way some w—standardly, the way in which one actually φs—is a way for one to φ.8  
Intellectualists have argued that endorsing this thesis offers several distinct advantages: it coheres 
better with contemporary theories of  the syntax of  “knows how” constructions, it offers a more 
parsimonious metaphysics of  knowledge, and it explains a variety of  cases involving agents who know 
how to φ in spite of  being unable to φ themselves.9 
 One less widely discussed aspect of  the Intellectualist thesis is its implications for the relation 
between knowledge-how and belief.  Assuming, as is standard, that knowledge entails belief, then a 
corollary of  the central Intellectualist thesis is that knowing that w is a way for one to φ entails believing 
that w is a way for one to φ.10  If, then, there are cases in which an agent both knows how to φ and 
fails to believe that the way she in fact φs is a way for her to φ, these will pose a serious challenge for 
Intellectualism.  Schematically, Intellectualists will have three options for dealing with such cases: (1) 
deny that there are such cases by denying that the agents in question know how to φ; (2) deny that 
there are such cases by denying that the agents in question fail to believe that the way they in fact φ is 
a way for them to φ; or (3), accept that there are such cases but deny that knowledge entails belief.  
                                                 
6 We have largely followed Stanley & Williamson (2001)’s presentation of  Ryle’s regress argument.  For alternative 
interpretations of  Ryle’s arguments, see Cath, 2013 and Fridland, 2013.  For Anti-Intellectualism generally, see Hartland 
Swan, 1956; Roland, 1958; Koethe, 2002; Schiffer, 2002; Noë, 2005; Cath, 2011 (but see Cath 2015 and footnote 15); 
Setiya, 2012; Fridland, forthcoming; and [reference removed]. 
7 Intellectualism is defended in Stanley & Williamson, 2001; Snowden, 2003; Bengson & Moffett, 2007; Brogaard, 2008, 
2009, 2011; Stanley, 2011a, b; and Pavese, ms.  For arguments against the force of  Ryle’s regress, see Stanley & Williamson, 
2001; Cath, 2011; and Stanley, 2011b.  For critical responses, see Noë 2005 and Fridland 2013. 
8 Two exceptions have arisen in the recent literature: Glick, 2011 and Bengson & Moffett, 2011.  Glick casts what he calls 
“Weak Intellectualism” as a primarily linguistic thesis, in contrast to his “Strong Intellectualism,” which identifies 
knowledge-how with theoretical knowledge.  Benson & Moffett (2011), in contrast, propose that “[h]aving objectual 
knowledge of  a way w of  φ-ing while grasping a correct and complete conception of  w is necessary and sufficient for 
knowing how to φ” (187).  We presume that “grasping a correct and complete conception of  w” requires having the true 
belief  that w is a way of  φ-ing.  Thus we take our arguments below to apply to Bengson & Moffett’s version of  
Intellectualism.  In contrast, we shall have little to say about Glick’s preferred Weak Intellectualism, which is (by design) 
more akin to Anti-Intellectualism in the respects with which we are here concerned. 
9 For Anti-Intellectualist explanations of  this latter sort of  case, see Noë, 2005; Setiya, 2012; and [reference removed]. 
10 The thesis that knowledge entails belief  has been endorsed in Cohen, 1966; Armstrong, 1969, 1973; Sorenson, 1982; 
Dartnall, 1986; Rose & Schaffer, 2012; and Ichikawa & Steup, 2014; among others. 
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Crucially, apparent no-belief  cases are not a problem for Anti-Intellectualists.  This is because 
knowledge-how, understood as something irreducible to propositional knowledge-that—something 
like an ability (Ryle, 1949), a “seeming” (Cath, 2011), or a form of  acquaintance (reference removed)—
does not entail belief.  The pressing question, then, is whether there really are cases in which agents 
know how to φ without believing of  the relevant w—the way in which they actually φ—that it is the 
way they φ. In the next two sections, we shall argue that there plausibly are such cases. 
  
3. Extant No-Belief  Cases 
 The relevance of  no-belief  cases to the knowledge-how debate was first noted (to the best of  
our knowledge) by Wallis (2008).  Much as we do below, Wallis turned to empirical psychology in 
order to provide cases where agents appear to know how to φ while simultaneously failing to believe 
that any particular w is a way for them to φ.  Wallis offered two such cases: (i) sleepwalkers who 
competently drive cars while sleeping; and (ii) severe amnesiac patients who can learn to solve certain 
sorts of  puzzles, but who can offer no explanation of  how they solve those puzzles (p. 133).11  Prima 
facie, Wallis argues, sleepwalkers manifest no beliefs at all.  Thus, while their actions demonstrate their 
knowledge of  how to drive cars, it seems that they don’t believe that the way they drive is, in fact, a 
way for them to drive.  Likewise, amnesiac patients are unable to explicitly remember any of  the 
strategies they have learned to solve the relevant puzzles.  Thus, they too seem to know how to φ—in 
this case, know how to solve puzzles—without believing that the way they φ is a way for them to φ.  
Both (i) and (ii) therefore look to be cases that violate the Intellectualists’ commitment to the claim 
that knowing how to φ requires knowing that some particular w is a way for one to φ, on the 
assumption that knowledge entails belief. 
 As Stanley (2011) and Glick (2011) have argued, however, Wallis’ analysis of  these cases is 
ultimately unpersuasive.  First of  all, in order to even make sense of  (i) as a challenge to Intellectualism, 
we had to slide from talking about “belief-possession” to “belief-manifestation.”  It is highly unclear 
that Intellectualists need be committed to anything in particular about the manifestation of  relevant 
beliefs in exhibiting know-how.  More importantly, it seems plausible to think that Wallis’ sleepwalkers 
and amnesiacs do believe that the way they in fact φ is a way for them to φ.  It is just that these beliefs 
are not conscious.  Positing that these agents possess myriad unconscious beliefs guiding their actions 
hardly looks ad hoc; such beliefs would, for instance, also help to explain why sleepwalkers generally 
search for food in the refrigerator, not in the washing machine.12  Likewise, in exhibiting familiarity 
with the relevant puzzles and strategies, severe amnesiacs might well be manifesting unconscious 
beliefs about these things.  For Wallis’ cases to prove a genuine challenge to Intellectualists, it must be 
the case that Intellectualists are committed to the claim that knowing how to φ requires the conscious, 
explicit belief  that w is a way to φ.  We are unaware of  Intellectualists committing themselves to any 
                                                 
11 Wallis’ cases are themselves drawn from Luce & Segal (1966) and Schacter (1989), respectively.  Wallis presents these 
cases in a somewhat different manner than we do here, and offers them along with a variety of  other sorts of  cases that 
he suggests to be equally problematic for Intellectualists.   
12 [Name removed] informs us that there are case reports of  sleepwalkers eating non-food items, such as metal scouring 
sponges and cigarette butt smoothies.  We do not speculate about what these sleepwalkers believe, or what they know how 
to do, but find these to be interesting questions for future research. 
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such thesis.13  It is therefore open to Intellectualists to claim that something like an implicit or 
unconscious belief  that w is a way for one to φ will suffice to underwrite knowing how to φ.  In that 
case, neither of  Wallis’ (i) or (ii) present a genuine challenge to Intellectualism.   
A different sort of  no-belief  case, introduced recently in Cath (2011), constitutes a more 
serious threat to the Intellectualist position: 
 
 The Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator: Jodie occasionally suffers from a peculiar kind of  hallucination. 
On occasion it seems to her that she remembers events of  learning how to φ, when in fact no 
such event occurred.  Furthermore, the way Jodie ‘remembers’ as being the way to φ is not a 
way to φ at all.  On Saturday, a clown teaches Jodie how to juggle.  By the end of  the class she 
knows how to juggle, and is juggling confidently.  And so there is a way, call it ‘w3’, such that 
Jodie now believes that w3 is a way for her to juggle, namely, the way the clown taught her to 
juggle.  On Sunday, Jodie is about to tell a friend the good news that she knows how to juggle.  
However, as she begins, the alarm goes off  on her false memory detector (or FMD), a 
remarkable device that is a super-reliable detector of  her false memories. This indicates to 
Jodie that her apparent memory of  learning how to juggle is not only a false memory but that 
it is also misleading with respect to the way to juggle.  Normally, Jodie would revise her beliefs 
accordingly, and this is exactly what Jodie does.  So, she no longer believes that she knows how 
to juggle or that w3 is a way for her to juggle.  Of  course, Jodie did learn how to juggle 
yesterday, so her FMD has made an error, albeit one that was highly unlikely.  (p. 116) 
 
According to Cath, intuitively, Jodie knows how to juggle (p. 116).  And yet, for no w does she believe 
that w is a way for her to juggle.  Thus, according to Cath, there is no w such that Jodie knows of  that 
w that it is a way for her to juggle (p. 117).14  That, in turn, entails that the Intellectualist analysis cannot 
be correct—for Intellectualists claimed that knowing how to juggle just is knowing that some w is a 
way for one to juggle.15 
                                                 
13 Wallis (2008) claims that Stanley & Williamson “themselves acknowledge that…second-order beliefs about what I would 
call the epistemic status (or neutrally, the reliability of) complex sets of  dispositions are not sufficient for knowledge-how 
(Stanley & Williamson, 2001, p. 416).  But, they do assert the necessity of  such beliefs” (p. 139).  We can’t locate such an 
assertion in Stanley & Williamson (2001).  That essay certainly contains a number of  assertions to the effect that knowledge 
about what Wallis calls “sets of  dispositions” (and what Stanley & Williamson call “ways”) is necessary for knowledge-how.  
But nowhere, to our knowledge, do Stanley & Williamson commit themselves to a particular picture of  how knowledge 
and belief  are related to each other. 
14 In order to justify this transition, it seems to us that Cath (2011) must be tacitly assuming that knowledge that P entails 
belief  that P.  We cannot, however, find anywhere where Cath make this assumption explicit. 
15 More recently, Cath (2015) has embraced a version of Intellectualism, which he calls “Revisionary Intellectualism.”  
Cath’s (2011) main objection to Intellectualism was that knowledge-how is irreducible to knowledge-that because there 
are cases in which knowledge-how, but not knowledge-that, is consistent with Gettier-style luck.  Cath’s (2015) view is 
that “knowledge-how is a distinctively practical species of knowledge-that, where one of the properties that distinguishes 
it from other kinds of knowledge-that is this compatibility with Gettier-style luck” (9).  We worry that any version of 
Intellectualism, revisionary or otherwise, that ascribes different properties to different “species” of knowledge, effectively 
becomes indistinguishable from Anti-Intellectualism.  In §5.1, we discuss this worry at greater length, though not with 
respect to Cath’s newest view in particular.  We would also note that Cath (2015) does not discuss in any detail how 
6 
 The strategy of  appealing to implicit or unconscious belief  looks less promising in The Non-
Dogmatic Hallucinator than it did above.  One problem is that—in contrast to the sleepwalker and 
amnesiac cases—attributing implicit or unconscious beliefs to Jodie seems ad hoc.  The motivation for 
doing so seems to be that, were Jodie to lack such a belief, Intellectualism would be false.  Another 
problem is that Jodie explicitly rejects that w3 is a way for her to juggle.  Thus, if  we attribute to Jodie an 
additional, implicit belief  that w3 is a way for her to juggle, we are thereby attributing contradictory 
beliefs to Jodie.  We discuss freestanding arguments for positing contradictory beliefs below (§5.2), 
but here we simply note the extra explanatory burden with which Intellectualism is now saddled.  In 
addition to showing that knowing-how reduces to knowing-that, Intellectualists must also now show 
that agents can hold contradictory beliefs, and that contradictory beliefs represent the best explanation 
of  cases like The Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator.  To foreshadow an additional worry: if  we posit 
contradictory beliefs, then whenever we want to appeal to an agent’s belief  that P in order to explain 
her having φ-ed, in a case of  contradictory belief, we will also now need to ask why that belief  that P 
was operative in this context rather than her belief  that ~P. 
 We are hesitant, however, to draw too much from cases like The Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator.  This 
case involves (i) an imaginary agent who regularly hallucinates vividly enough such that she cannot 
subsequently distinguish between these hallucinations and reality, yet who seems perfectly healthy in 
other respects, so much so that she can learn new complex skills like juggling;  (ii) a piece of  science 
fiction technology called a “false memory detector” (FMD); and (iii), a highly unusual exception to 
the super-reliability of  the FMD, which Jodie the imaginary yet highly functioning hallucinator fails to 
notice, such that now she fails to believe that she knows how to do what she does in fact know how 
to do.  This is a long walk to a counterexample to Intellectualism!  Moreover, we suspect that some 
Intellectualists might be willing to bite the bullet and simply deny that Jodie knows how to juggle, 
despite the fact that it seems very much like Jodie does indeed know how to juggle.  Other potential 
no-belief  cases in the literature—such as Bengson & Moffett’s (2007) Salchow—are similarly bizarre.16  
We note in addition how intuitions about thought experiments like these can be affected by seemingly 
irrelevant factors like word order, moral valence, context, and even font (Gendler, 2007).  
Intellectualists would not look to be in terrible shape were they to simply deny that cases like these 
represent serious counterexamples to their view.   
 Of  course, bizarre thought experiments hold an important place in the history of  philosophy.  
Some have urged caution (Dennett, 2014; Williamson, 2008), while others have insisted that these 
kinds of  cases are useful so long as there is one way of  filling out the details such that the case 
represents a counterexample to some theory (Ichikawa & Jarvis, 2009).  Thankfully, we needn’t resolve 
this issue here.  For although they have thus far gone unnoticed in philosophy, there are significantly 
better no-belief  cases to be found in the empirical literature than those to which Wallis appealed.  Such 
cases preserve the dialectical merits of  Cath’s The Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator without forcing us to stray 
into the realm of  extreme science fiction.  What’s more, these cases involve far more pedestrian 
                                                 
Revisionary Intellectualism can handle a case like The Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator, and Cath notes that cases like this are the 
“trickiest” for (even Revisionary) Intellectualists to handle.   
16 We decline to discuss this case at length since Bengson & Moffett (2007) insist that it is not actually a case of  knowledge-
how.  For discussion of  some related cases, see Poston, 2009. 
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psychological phenomena than sleepwalking or amnesia.  We turn now to the task of  introducing 
these cases, drawn from recent research on skilled motor action. 
 
4. New No-Belief  Cases 
 In many ball sports, like baseball, tennis, and cricket, athletes are taught to play by “watching 
the ball” or to “keep their eye on the ball.”  This instruction serves several purposes.  Focusing on the 
ball can help players to pick up nuances in the angle and spin of  the incoming serve or pitch; it can 
help players to keep their head still, which is particularly important in sports like tennis, where one has 
to meet the ball with one’s racquet at a precise angle while one’s body is in full motion; and it can help 
players avoid distractions.  One thing that attempting to “watch the ball” does not do, however, is cause 
players to actually visually track the ball from the point of  release (in baseball or cricket), or opponent 
contact (in tennis), to the point of  contact with one’s own bat or racquet.  In fact, it is well-established 
that ball players at any level of  skill make anticipatory saccades to shift their gaze ahead of  the ball 
one or more times during the course of  its flight towards them.  These saccades—the shifting of  the 
eye gaze in front of  the ball—occur despite the fact that most players (at least explicitly) believe that 
they are visually tracking the ball the whole time. 
 The standard explanation of  these saccades is that it is simply impossible to visually track an 
object moving so quickly toward the origin of  one’s gaze.  Players must therefore shift their gaze ahead 
of  the ball at various points in its flight path and then wait for it to catch up (Bahill and LaRitz, 1984; 
McLeod, 1987; Land and McLeod, 2000).  Bahill and LaRitz (1984), for instance, claim that in sports 
such as baseball, tennis, and cricket, where the velocity of  the ball can exceed 100 mph, it is physically 
impossible for players to track the movement of  the ball when it is closer than 5 feet from them.  In 
baseball, for example, as the ball approaches the batter, the horizontal angle of  the ball—defined as 
the angle between the line of  sight from the batter’s eye to centerfield and the line of  sight from the 
batter’s eye to the ball—increases at a speed far faster than a human being’s apparent maximum 
possible gaze velocity (defined as smooth-pursuit eye tracking plus head movement).  At 5.5 feet from 
the plate, the retinal image of  a baseball traveling 60 mph is changing at 1,100˚/sec, yet gaze velocity 
in a professional baseball player does not appear to exceed 150˚/second.  What good professional 
baseball players consistently do when batting is track the ball for some period after its release, then 
shift their eye gaze without tracking to a point part way between themselves and the pitcher and watch 
the ball as it passes that point.  Finally, they shift their gaze once more, again without tracking, to the 
expected point of  contact.17 For our purposes, the ultimate explanation of  these saccades is largely 
beside the point; regardless of  why exactly they do so, it seems clear that baseball, cricket, and tennis 
players of  all skill levels make anticipatory saccades rather than smoothly tracking the ball from the 
point of  release to the point of  contact. 
 There are two relevant beliefs that a batter who intends to hit by “watching the ball” might 
                                                 
17 Mann and colleagues’ (2013) recent work on cricketers suggests that the full explanation of  these saccades may be 
somewhat more complicated.  Truly elite cricketers, it seems, are capable of  achieving a higher gaze velocity than even 
other highly skilled players.  Under certain conditions, they may in fact be able to track the ball from start to finish.  But 
even these truly elite players still consistently make anticipatory saccades in spite of  this ability. 
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have: (i) a true belief  that she predicts when the ball will cross the plate and then makes an anticipatory 
saccade to that spot; (ii) a false belief  that she visually tracks the ball from the pitcher’s point of  release 
until and through the point of  contact with the bat.  Most batters, we presume, explicitly hold (ii) and 
reject (i).18  What’s more, we take it that (ii)—the belief  that one hits by visually tracking the ball until 
and through the point of  contact—contradicts (i)—the belief  that one hits by making an anticipatory 
saccade to the point of  contact.19  It is also important to note that this false belief  (ii) clearly fails to 
intrude at the level of  action.  Intending to watch the ball helps one succeed as a batter regardless of  
whether one is watching the ball in the way that one thinks one is.  Furthermore, one watches the ball 
intentionally.  Watching the ball is an intentional action which is itself  a component of  a more complex 
action (i.e., batting).   
 Relatedly, it also seems reasonable to suppose that most batters believe that they “watch the 
ball” by having a clear visual image of  the ball as it comes towards them.  Recent work by Mann and 
colleagues (2007) calls into question that this is in fact how batters bat, however.  It seems that skilled 
cricketers suffer little to no loss in their batting abilities even when they are wearing contact lenses 
that significantly impair their vision.  A significant reduction of  these cricketers’ batting skill was only 
observed when the contact lenses were so extremely mis-prescribed that the batters’ effective eyesight 
became equivalent to that of  someone on the border of  legal blindness.  Contrary to what most batters 
presumably believe, then, one does not even have to be able to see the ball clearly in order to watch 
the ball in whatever way is relevant to hitting it.20 
 Similar, and perhaps even more vivid, results obtain with regard to catching balls.  For example, 
Reed and colleagues (2010) have shown that fielders in various ball sports believe that when they are 
catching a ball their gaze rises and then falls as the ball falls.  These fielders not only believe that this 
is what their gaze is doing, but they also report experiencing their gaze rising and falling.  But in fact, 
                                                 
18 See Reed and colleagues (2010), discussed below.  We also presume that most kids are taught to watch the ball until and 
through the point of  contact, as we were. 
19 One might worry that the way we have stated (i) and (ii) subtly departs from what Intellectualists are committed to, 
which might seem to be the weaker claim that batters must have a belief  of  the form, “w1 is a way for one to hit the ball.”  
Of  course, one might perfectly rationally believe that w1 is a way for one to hit the ball while also believing that some other 
w2, which is incompatible with w1 , is also a way for one to hit the ball. Beliefs along these lines will only contradict each 
other when they are about how one and the same person hits the ball in a single instance, not when they are general beliefs 
about the variety of  different ways in which one might hit a ball.  While the concern is perfectly reasonable, it is clear that 
Intellectualists have always had in mind to defend the stronger claim that knowledge-how is knowledge of  the way that 
one oneself  φs, not of  the variety of  ways in which one might, in general, φ.  Stanley & Williamson (2001), for instance, 
stress that the sense of  “knowing how to φ” which interests them is a first-personal sense, involving knowledge of  how 
one φs oneself, not of  how someone in general might φ (pp. 424-25).  What’s more, Stanley & Williamson (2001) explicitly 
link the possession of  knowledge-how, in the relevant sense, to the possession of  certain (unspecified) complex 
dispositions (p. 429; see also Stanley 2011, pp. 109-10).  Such dispositions are, of  necessity, indexical; that is, they are 
necessarily linked to the knower rather than some other agent.  Far from being uncharitable to the Intellectualist, it is the 
very indexicality that the Intellectualist posits that our characterizations of  (i) and (ii) are designed to capture. Thanks to 
[name removed] for pushing us to clarify this point.        
20 For ease of  exposition we will stick with baseball from here on out when discussing the “watch the ball” example. 
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unless the ball is caught below eye-level, the fielder’s gaze goes up continuously and does not fall.21  
Reed and colleagues report that most participants in controlled studies appear to be unaware of  any 
discrepancy between their reports and their behavior. “Conscious perceptual judgments,” they write, 
“were not simply incomplete: They were often confidently wrong” (Reed et al., 2010, p. 73).  Knowing 
how to catch a ball, it seems, is perfectly compatible with having a very flawed understanding—even 
a false phenomenology—of  ball-catching. 
Cases like these make the problem for Intellectualists explicit.22  Professional batters know 
how to hit baseballs.  These batters in fact hit baseballs by shifting their gaze ahead of the ball, or by 
making anticipatory saccades, rather than by smoothly tracking it from the point of release to the point 
of contact.  However, these batters believe that they hit baseballs by watching the ball in a different 
manner—specifically, by smoothly tracking it from start to finish.  What’s more, these batters would 
likely deny that they hit balls in part by making anticipatory saccades rather than smoothly tracking 
the ball.  Thus, there appears to be no w such that w both accurately characterizes how professional 
batters hit baseballs and what those batters believe to be the way they hit a baseball.  But if 
Intellectualism is correct, and if knowledge entails belief, then there should be just such a w.  This is 
the threat posed by our version of no-belief cases. 
 Let us take stock of  the dialectic so far.  We have tried in this section to provide a more 
compelling version of  the argument against Intellectualism from no-belief  cases than the versions 
offered by either Cath or Wallis.  In contrast to Cath, the no-belief  cases we presented are real, 
mundane, and common.  Ours are in fact cases involving human beings performing at the peak of  
their abilities, in more or less ideal psychological and physical ways, rather than cases in which people 
suffer mysterious cognitive deficits and are subject to bizarre twists of  luck.  Intellectualists, therefore, 
cannot simply dismiss these cases as being too far-fetched to productively inform philosophical 
argument.  In contrast to Wallis, our version of  the argument from no-belief  cases requires making 
no assumptions about the relationship between knowledge and conscious, explicit belief—
assumptions that look like they can be plausibly denied in the sorts of  cases Wallis discusses.  Instead, 
we rely on a pair of  significantly weaker assumptions: (i) that knowledge entails belief  of  one sort or 
another; and (ii), that a sincere, explicit disavowal of  P provides at least some evidence to the effect 
that one does not believe P.  We take this shift to represent a significant dialectical advantage.  Denying 
our (i) and (ii) has significant ramifications for Intellectualism, ramifications that denying Wallis’ 
assumption that knowledge entails explicit belief  does not.  We discuss these ramifications in the next 
two sections.  We also note here that while Wallis’ cases involve merely the absence of  the relevant 
                                                 
21 See also Dienes & McLeod, 1993 and Jeannerod, 2006. 
22 We think it likely that there may be yet more kinds of no-belief cases to be found in other areas of empirical psychology.  
For example, Marcel’s (2003) “vibro-tactile illusion,” which causes participants to feel as if there arm is in a location where 
it is not, presents a case in which agents apparently know how to move their arm from point A to point B yet explicitly 
disavow that the way that they have just moved their arm from A to B is a way for them to do so.  Similarly, in Bechara 
and colleagues’ (1997) “Iowa Gambling Task,” most participants know how to pick cards from rewarding decks long 
before they report having any beliefs about the decks or preferences between them.  Finally, cases in which members of 
socially stigmatized groups come to believe stereotypes about their own inability to φ—for example, women who doubt 
their ability to do philosophy—despite demonstrably knowing how to φ, may provide another set of cases.  We hope to 
investigate these cases in future research.  
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beliefs, the cases we present involve both the absence of  the relevant belief  and the agent’s explicit 
disavowal of  that belief.24   
Before moving on, it is also worth noting exactly how our version of  the argument from no-
belief  cases relates to the prima facie similar line of  argument advanced by Hubert Dreyfus (2002a,b, 
2005, 2007a,b; Dreyfus & Kelly, 2007).  In very rough outline, Dreyfus appeals to the phenomenology 
of  skilled action to argue that knowledge-how does not amount to a type of  knowledge-that.  For 
Dreyfus, the phenomenology of  skilled action, particularly expert action, is exhausted by mindless 
responsiveness to “affordances” (Gibson, 1979).  For example, Dreyfus (2002) writes, 
 
[C]onsider a tennis swing.  If  one is a beginner or is off  one’s form one might find oneself  
making an effort to keep one’s eye on the ball, keep the racket perpendicular to the court, hit 
the ball squarely, etc.  But if  one is expert at the game, things are going well, and one is 
absorbed in the game, what one experiences is more like one’s arm going up and its being 
drawn to the appropriate position, the racket forming the optimal angle with the court—an 
angle one need not even be aware of—all this so as to complete the gestalt made up of  the 
court, one’s running opening, and the oncoming ball.  One feels that one’s comportment was 
caused by the perceived conditions in such a way as to reduce a sense of  deviation from some 
satisfactory gestalt.  But that final gestalt need not be represented in one’s mind.  Indeed, it is 
not something one could represent.  One only senses when one is getting closer or further away 
from the optimum.  (p. XX) 
 
Dreyfus argues that skilled action like this demonstrates a form of  “understanding,” akin in his view 
to Aristotle’s conception of  “practical wisdom” or phronesis, and that this form of  understanding can 
be expressed as knowledge-how (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 59).  Moreover, the form of  understanding 
exhibited in skilled action is fundamentally different from knowledge-that.  Dreyfus offers various 
reasons for this.  He claims that the phenomenology of  skilled action cannot be mentally represented 
(op. cit.); he doubts that reasons for action influence agents during performance (2005, pp. 50-51); he 
denies that skill is the exercise of  “conceptual” capacities (2007a,b); and he points to the sometimes 
deleterious effects of  reflection upon expert performance (also known as “Steve Blass Disease”).25   
                                                 
24 To be clear: while we suggested in §3 that it is plausible that the agents in Wallis’ cases have the relevant unconscious 
beliefs, we do not ultimately know what sleepwalkers and severe amnesiacs believe.  If  sleepwalkers and amnesiacs do in 
fact lack beliefs of  any sort regarding, for example, where to find food, drive cars, or solve puzzles, then our argument and 
Wallis’ argument will effectively coincide.  This should come as no surprise; our cases are purported no-belief  cases, like 
Wallis’ own, and our argument proceeds on the basis of  pointing out those cases.  Our aim here is not to introduce such 
cases ex nihilo, but rather to refine the argument from such cases in a way that ought to prove more difficult for the 
Intellectualist to resist.  This refinement involves both (i) shifting the sorts of  no-belief  cases under consideration to some 
which we hope will elicit clearer judgments than those which Wallis pointed to, and (ii) shifting our focus to what we 
ultimately take to be the crux of  the issue, the question of  when it is appropriate to attribute implicit, contradictory beliefs 
to an agent.  We thank an anonymous reviewer for this journal for pushing us to clarify this point.        
25 Steve Blass was a tremendously successful pitcher in Major League Baseball who suddenly and inexplicitly lost his ability 
to pitch.  Physicians could find nothing physically wrong with Blass, and his troubles were thought to be due to 
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 While we are sympathetic to much of  Dreyfus’ view, and while we find a certain conceptual 
affinity between the conclusion of  our argument and Dreyfus’ claim that human beings cannot be 
“full-time rational animal[s]”—assuming this means that knowledge-how is both ineliminable and 
irreducible to knowledge-that—we are highly skeptical that phenomenology alone can settle the 
debate about Intellectualism.  For one, it is unclear what the phenomenology of  an implicit belief  is 
like, if  it is like anything at all.26  We are also unsure how to settle disagreements about the relevant 
phenomenology; Barbara Montero (2010), for example, describes the phenomenology of  expert 
athletics in terms starkly different than does Dreyfus.  Finally, while we accept that phenomenology 
plays an important role in specifying what it is that we are trying to understanding—namely, what it is 
to know how to do something—and while we also agree with Dreyfus that the relevant 
phenomenology suggests a deep difference between practical and theoretical knowledge, we are also 
open to the possibility of  phenomenology sometimes turning out to be highly misleading about the 
nature of  the mind.27  Our arguments, we hope, avoid these challenges.    
  
5. Intellectualist Options 
 The Intellectualist now faces a choice.  First, she can claim that the relevant agents do not 
know how to bat or catch, despite their apparently being skilled batters and catchers.  Second, she can 
claim that the relevant agents really do believe what they explicitly claim not to believe.  Or, third, she 
can deny that knowledge-that entails belief. In our view, the first option is clearly unappealing, and we 
know of  no Intellectualists who have been tempted to pursue it.  Professional and even skilled amateur 
batsmen and fielders surely know how to bat and catch.  These are the experts we novices emulate.  
If  they don’t know how to bat and catch, or to bat and catch by watching the ball, then no one does.  
This leaves the second and third options in contention.  We shall address these in reverse order. 
 
5.1 Knowledge without Belief 
The third option, denying that knowledge-that entails belief, appears more promising than the first.  
And, in fact, this sort of  view has recently been explored in Brogaard (2011).  Brogaard suggests that 
no-belief  cases should be considered against the background of  a larger set of  issues in epistemology, 
namely, how to deal with the fact that we often attribute knowledge to beings, such as small children 
and many non-human animals, who plausibly lack full-blooded belief  states (p. 151).  In response to 
this wider problem, Brogaard invites us to think of  knowledge as follows: 
 
[K]nowledge need not be a belief  state that satisfies certain epistemic constraints. Rather, 
knowledge is a determinable of  which other mental states are determinates. Perceptual states, 
                                                 
“overthinking.”  Dreyfus (2007a) discusses another baseball player—Chuck Knoblauch—in similar terms.  While some 
research appears to support the idea that overthinking is the problem in cases like these (e.g., Flegal & Anderson, 2008; 
Beilock & Gray, 2012), the issue remains unsettled.  For critical discussion, see Montero (2010) and [reference removed].  
26 But see [reference removed] for discussion.  Note also that Stanley (2011) discusses some related arguments due to Kelly 
(2000, 2002) and Toribio (2008).  As these arguments are less easily confused with our own, we refrain from discussing 
them here.  See Stanley, 2011 (pp. 170-72). 
27 Indeed, one could understand the history of  social psychology as illuminating the many ways in which we fail to know 
what we are doing and why, notwithstanding how things appear to us. 
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standing belief  states, judgments, realizations, recollections, ability states, introspective states, 
and so on, are all determinates of  knowledge, as long as they satisfy certain epistemic 
constraints. Some of  these, for example seeings, are primitive knowledge states, others are 
standard knowledge states. (Ibid., p. 152) 
 
Essentially, Brogaard suggests that a wide range of  problems in epistemology can be solved by 
thinking of  knowledge as a basic kind of  mental state, one that can be manifested in an array of  
different creatures and circumstances by an array of  different, more specific mental states: knowledge-
beliefs, knowledge-judgments, knowledge-realizations, etc.  What unifies these various states is that 
they exhibit certain further epistemic properties (e.g., safety, reliability) to be specified by means of  
sustained, detailed epistemic inquiry.   
 What sort of  state does knowledge-how amount to then, on Brogaard’s proposed picture?  
Presumably, paradigm instances of  knowledge-how amount to knowledge-ability states—that is, 
ability states which themselves counts as knowledge in virtue of  their exhibiting certain epistemic 
properties.28  While we submit that there is nothing incoherent about this position, we nonetheless 
find it unsatisfying.  This is because it is not at all clear that Brogaard’s suggestion constitutes a genuine 
alternative to Anti-Intellectualism.29  If  it doesn’t, then Brogaard’s perhaps true claim that knowledge 
doesn’t necessarily entail belief  can be understood as pertaining specifically to knowledge-how.  And, 
of  course, Anti-Intellectualists can and do accept that knowledge-how doesn’t entail belief.  
According to Anti-Intellectualists, knowledge-that and knowledge-how are fundamentally 
different sorts of  things.  One natural way of  translating this into Brogaard’s picture would be to claim 
that knowledge-beliefs and knowledge-ability states are fundamentally different.  According to 
Brogaard, the fact that knowledge-ability states and knowledge-beliefs are both instances of  
knowledge suffices to make them fundamentally the same sort of  thing.  According to the Anti-
Intellectualist, though, the fact that these are very different sorts of  instances of  knowledge suffices 
to make them fundamentally different sorts of  things. The dispute between Brogaard and the Anti-
Intellectualist thus threatens to degenerate into a merely verbal dispute.30  Put slightly differently: it is 
not at all clear that the concept FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT is being applied in a consistent manner 
across these two views.  If  not, then the real disagreement between Brogaard and Anti-Intellectualists 
may be about how to apply the concept FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT, with the underlying facts about 
knowledge-how being agreed upon by all parties.31 
                                                 
28 We say “paradigm” here since, as Brogaard is herself  well-aware, agents can plausibly know how to φ without themselves 
being able to φ, at least in certain circumstances.  So, for Brogaard, it would seem that a true attribution of  knowledge-
how to φ is sometimes to be grounded in a knowledge-ability state and sometimes in another sort of  knowledge-state.  
See also Hawley (2005) for discussion of  the counterfactual robustness of  knowledge-how. 
29 Parallel worries would afflict more standard Intellectualists were they to claim that the sorts of  complex dispositions 
characteristic of  practical modes of  presentation either entail or are identical to ability-states.  For discussion of  this sort 
of  concern, see Koethe (2002) and, more recently, Glick (forthcoming).  
30 On the nature of verbal disputes, see Chalmers, 2011. 
31 Such disagreements can themselves plausibly be both philosophical and productive, however.  See Burgess and Plunkett, 
2013a, b and Plunkett and Sundell, 2013 for discussion. 
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Unsurprisingly, Brogaard is hardly the only philosopher to have taken seriously the possibility 
that knowledge might not entail belief.32 For instance, Myers-Schultz & Schwitzgebel (2013) have 
recently resuscitated arguments originally found in Radford (1966) against that assumption.  
Essentially, Myers-Schultz & Schwitzgebel point to a series of  cases in which an agent seemingly 
knows that P even though she will sincerely and explicitly disavow believing that P.  We eschew a full 
consideration of  these arguments in the present context for two reasons: first, this sort of  argument 
looks to rely on some strong assumptions about the luminosity of  belief  that we lack the space to 
properly consider. 33  Second, considered in the present context, the argument is complicated by 
Schwitzgebel’s more general commitment to “Anti-Intellectualism” about belief, and indeed about 
attitudes in general.  Schwitzgebel’s (2010, 2013) view is that attitudes just are a certain sort of  complex 
disposition.  If  this thesis is correct, it would upend the entirety of  the debate between Intellectualists 
and Anti-Intellectualists about knowledge-how, at least in its present form. 
There will, of  course, be many other ways of  denying that knowledge entails belief, and some 
Intellectualists will no doubt be attracted to this sort of  position.34  Rather than trying to cut off  every 
avenue here, we wish merely to suggest the following: if  the Intellectualist is tempted to carve off  
knowledge-how as a special kind of  knowledge that doesn’t entail belief, then she risks collapsing the 
distinction between her preferred view and Anti-Intellectualism.  If, on the other hand, the 
Intellectualist is tempted to deny that knowledge entails belief  more broadly, then she will be forced 
to take on a fairly revisionary theory of  the relation between knowledge and belief.  What’s more, if  
she relies on cases that look anything like Myers-Schultz & Schwitzgebel’s, she will have to offer an 
independent argument for the general transparency of  belief.  Either way, it looks to us as though the 
explanatory burdens of  denying that knowledge entails belief, either in general or more narrowly, will 
prove substantial. 
 
5.2 Implicit Belief 
As we suggested earlier, we think that the second option—positing that these agents really do believe 
what they explicitly claim to disbelieve—is the most plausible Intellectualist interpretation of no-belief 
cases.  The viability of this option clearly hinges on the plausibility of attributing implicit or 
unconscious beliefs that conflict with the agents’ explicitly avowed beliefs.35   
This brings us face-to-face with a very difficult question, and one that is familiar from other 
parts of contemporary epistemology:  how ought we, in general, attribute beliefs to agents in cases of 
discord between what an agent avows and how she behaves?  In §3, we offered reasons why Jodie’s 
apparent knowledge of how to juggle is unlikely to be explained by appeal to implicit or unconscious 
beliefs.  We suggested that positing implicit or unconscious beliefs in this case seems ad hoc.  Moreover, 
                                                 
32 Brogaard is, however, the only philosopher we know of  to have argued for the claim that knowledge doesn’t generally 
entail belief  in the course of  arguing for Intellectualism about knowledge-how.  
33 For counter-arguments to the luminosity of  belief  thesis, see Rose & Schaffer, 2013 and Buckwalter et al., forthcoming.  
34 See also Nagel (2013) for another recent instance of  an argument towards this end. 
35 To be clear, these implicit beliefs in which we are interested are standing beliefs.  That is, they are long-term, stable states 
of  the agent rather than just fleeting implicit or unconscious states—though the existence of  the latter sort of  state is 
certainly a distinct possibility. 
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we suggested that positing implicit or unconscious beliefs in Jodie’s case means that she is in a state 
of contradictory belief, and that this state requires further explanation (an explanation which Anti-
Intellectualists need not offer).  We hesitated to draw conclusions from this kind of case, however.  
So the question is whether these same worries apply to the idea that implicit or unconscious beliefs 
provide a plausible explanation of what agents like professional batters and fielders know how to do. 
Implicit or unconscious beliefs are often defended as part of a theory of what Egan (2008, p. 
48) calls “fragmented belief:”   
 
Actual human beings don’t have a single coherent system of beliefs—either binary or graded—
that guides all of their behavior all of the time. The systems of belief that we in fact have are 
fragmented or, as Stalnaker (1984) and Lewis (1982) put it, compartmentalized. Rather than 
having a single system of beliefs that guides all of our behavior all of the time, we have a 
number of distinct, compartmentalized systems of belief, different ones of which drive 
different aspects of our behavior in different contexts. 
 
Agents with a fragmented system of belief will often have even contradictory beliefs, since on this 
view it is coherent that an agent A act upon belief P in one context but belief ~P in another context.  
In other words, instead of understanding the action-guiding role of belief in terms of agents being 
disposed to act in ways that would satisfy their desires if their beliefs were true, a theory of fragmented 
belief understands the action-guiding role of belief in terms of dispositions to act in ways that would 
satisfy an agent’s active desires if her active beliefs were true.  Or as Egan puts it: “[a]gents are disposed 
to act, in a context c and within a domain d, in ways that would satisfy their <c,d> active desires if 
their <c,d> active beliefs were true” (Egan, 2008, p. 52).36   
On this sort of a view, different kinds of fragments are likely to have different properties.  
Among these different properties are conscious accessibility and availability for verbal report.  So a 
theory of fragmented belief predicts that there will be cases in which agents consciously and genuinely 
avow ~P in one context but manifest a genuine belief that P in another.  This seems to apply to the 
cases we have presented.  Batters, for example, might be said to hold two contradictory beliefs with 
different properties.  First, they hold a genuine belief (P1) that the way that they watch the ball is by 
watching it all the way from the point of release to the point of contact; this belief is consciously 
accessible.  Second, they hold another genuine belief (P2) that the way that they watch the ball is by 
anticipating when it will cross the plate and then make an anticipatory saccade to that spot; this belief 
is not consciously accessible, or, at least, is not consciously accessed.37  P1 and P2 might have additional 
discrepant properties as well.  For example, P1 might display “inferential promiscuity” (Stich, 1978)—
that is, the ability to play a role in a huge set of inferences the agent might make—as well as 
                                                 
36 Versions of  what we are calling the “fragmented belief  theory” are defended in Egan, 2008, 2011; Huebner, 2009; 
Gertler, 2011; Huddleston, 2012; Muller & Bashour, 2011; and Mandelbaum, 2011, 2014.  Schwitzgebel (2010) defends a 
related theory of  “in-between” belief. 
37 In fact, this second belief  might only be represented indexically for the batter, along the lines of: I watch the ball this way 
or that is how I hit the ball.  In both these instances, the relevant demonstratives should be understood as being anchored in 
something like the batter’s experience of  batting, an experience which she might in fact be apt to misdescribe.  
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responsiveness to evidence and reason—that is, P1 might change under the right sort of rational 
pressure.  P2, on the other hand, might fail to display inferential promiscuity and might be unresponsive 
to rational pressure.  Indeed, no matter how much evidence and reason one gave a professional batter, 
you might not be able to dislodge P2.    
Thus far, we hope to have shown how the debate between Intellectualists and Anti-
Intellectualists plausibly converges with a separate debate in epistemology about belief attribution.  
Perhaps this convergence should come as no surprise.  After all, Stanley & Williamson (2001) claimed 
that knowing how to φ isn’t just reducible to knowing that w is a way for one to φ; rather, knowing 
how to φ reduces to knowing that w is a way for one to φ, where that proposition is presented under 
a “practical mode of presentation” (p. 429). For Stanley & Williamson (2001), “thinking of a way under 
a practical mode of presentation . . . entails the possession of certain complex dispositions” (p. 429).38 
This raises the possibility that Intellectualists always had in mind something like a fragmented picture 
of knowledge.  The complex dispositions entailed by thinking of a way to φ under a practical mode of 
presentation would be “actional,” in the sense that certain knowledge is known in a way relevant to 
the action system, whereas other knowledge is relevant to explicit, conscious reasoning.39 If this is 
right—and if Intellectualists like Stanley & Williamson were further inclined to posit that the structure 
of beliefs and knowledge largely parallel each other—than it should be no great leap for them to 
endorse a theory of fragmented belief alongside their theory of fragmented knowledge.  In that case, 
this third option should strike Intellectualists of this stripe as the natural response to no-belief cases. 
Our aim is not to argue for or against the claim that beliefs are fragmented as such.  We take 
this as a charge for future research.  As we noted in §3, however, at minimum we also think our 
arguments show that Intellectualism is saddled with an extra explanatory burden that Anti-
Intellectualists needn’t bear.  Intellectualists must first defend a particular theory of fragmented or 
contradictory belief.  Then, Intellectualists must further show that the agents in particular no-belief 
cases do in fact have unconscious or implicit beliefs that explain their behavior, alongside the beliefs 
that these agents will actually avow.40   
Appealing to a theory of fragmented belief in order to offer an Intellectualist-friendly 
explanation of no-belief cases raises three additional worries.  The first is that the Intellectualist 
interpretation of no-belief cases needs to explain contradictory occurrent beliefs, not just contradictory 
beliefs that are active in different contexts.  The cases of confabulation in sports that we discussed 
above don’t quite exhibit this structure, since in these cases the athletes do indeed report their beliefs 
about φ-ing in a different context (e.g., in an interview after the game) from the one in which they φ.  
However, there is no reason to think that these beliefs couldn’t be (or aren’t) occurrently conflicting.  
                                                 
38 For more extensive explication of  this notion of  a “practical mode of  presentation,” see Stanley, 2011 (esp. Ch. 4).  For 
critical discussion, see Glick, forthcoming.  
39 As noted in fn. 29 above, both Koethe (2002) and Glick (forthcoming) have argued that, if  the complex dispositions 
tied to practical modes of  presentation cannot be sufficiently distinguished from ability, this aspect of  Stanley & 
Williamson (2001) and Stanley (2011)’s view threatens to efface the distinction between their particular version of  
Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism.  We assume for present purposes that these can be sufficiently distinguished. 
40
 Williamson (ms) has recently argued that non-luminosity is a pervasive feature of  our mental lives.  If  this is right, it 
might help Intellectualism to meet the first challenge, though it does not necessarily speak to the second. 
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After all, the outfielders in Reed and colleagues’ (2010) study were “confidently wrong” about their 
perceptual judgments when catching fly balls.  Likewise, batters are  taught to hit the ball by smoothly 
tracking it with their gaze, and presumably this is exactly what they are trying to do when batting.  We 
also note an odd consequence of an Intellectualist interpretation of these cases in terms of occurrent 
contradictory beliefs.  Imagine a batter saying, “I know how to watch the ball, but I don’t believe that 
looking ahead to where I predict the ball will be is a way for me to watch the ball.”  It strikes us that 
a batter can utter this sentence truly.  But citing the batter’s contradictory beliefs, Intellectualists will 
have to claim that this sentence is false, since the second conjunct should prove to be false in virtue 
of the baseball player’s purported unconscious belief that looking ahead to where I predict the ball will be is 
a way of hitting the ball.  This strikes us as an odd interpretation of a common attitude, namely the 
attitude of knowing how to φ but disbelieving the truth about how one φs.    
The second worry is that, as Egan notes, a theory of fragmented belief must explain the 
processes of integration of an agent’s belief fragments.  As before, this is extra explanatory work for 
Intellectualism.  But, more importantly, the explanation of integration must work in cases of ordinary, 
skilled action.  The cases considered in the belief fragmentation literature are typically cases of 
irrational belief or irrational action.  Egan (2008), for example, focuses on cases of rational 
inconsistently (i.e., believing P&Q, and that P is inconsistent with Q), failures of closure (i.e., believing 
that if P then Q and believing P, but failing to believe Q), and differences between recall (e.g., “what 
was Val Kilmer’s character’s callsign in Top Gun?”) and recognition (“was ‘Iceman’ Val Kilmer’s 
character’s callsign in Top Gun?”).  No-belief cases, like those we have discussed, are different from 
these in the sense that they are not irrational.  The only conflict such cases present is between an 
agent’s behavior and her explicit beliefs.  So, in these cases, the agent’s purported fragmented beliefs 
really aren’t all that fragmented.  In fact, they are well-integrated.  While we see no reason why a theory 
of fragmented belief cannot explain this kind of integration in principle, we note that a more 
parsimonious explanation would focus on different kinds of mental states—some “action-guiding” 
and some “truth-taking”—that need not be rationally integrated.    
The third, and most significant, worry is that Intellectualists who appeal to a theory of 
fragmented belief will need to explain the distinct processes according to which different belief 
fragments update.  And, crucially, all of these distinct processes will have to remain doxastic.  As we 
noted before, different fragments will be predicted to have different properties, such as being 
consciously accessible.  We also mentioned properties like inferential promiscuity and responsiveness 
to evidence and reason.  The trouble is that some of these properties are distinctly different from the 
properties typically ascribed to belief states.  At some point it would seem that an unconscious state 
that is inferentially monogamous (so to speak) and insensitive to evidence and reason must fail to be a 
belief.41  The agent’s action-guiding state might be a mere association, an “alief” (Gendler, 2008a,b), or 
some other yet-to-be-understood subpersonal state.  For our purposes, it could be any of these, so 
long as associations, aliefs, and so on aren’t entailed by knowledge-that. 
Indeed, it looks like the agent’s action-guiding states in no-belief cases fail to display many 
ordinary doxastic properties.  States of belief—whether introspectively available or not—are thought 
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to be paradigmatically sensitive to changes in what an agent takes to be all-things-considered evidence 
(reference removed).  When the milk carton in the fridge turns out to weigh next to nothing, a normal 
agent will revise her belief that there is milk in the fridge.  But the same does not hold of the beliefs 
relevant to knowledge-how.  This becomes clear in situations in which an agent comes to genuinely 
believe that she ought to φ in w2, but persists in φing in w1.  In principle, this suggests that whatever 
mental state is associated with w1 is not sensitive to what the agent takes to be all-things-considered 
evidence.  We thus have reason to conclude, in such cases, that the mental state associated with w1 is 
not a belief.   
It is a common occurrence in skill-learning for agents to genuinely believe that they ought to 
φ in w2, but to nonetheless persist in φing in w1.  Consider that, recently, some of the best hitters in 
modern Major League Baseball (Albert Pujols, Barry Bonds, and Alex Rodriguez) all failed 
spectacularly to even make contact with softballs pitched to them by Jennie Finch, Team USA’s star 
softball pitcher.  This was despite the fact that Finch throws much more slowly than MLB pitchers 
and softballs are significantly larger than baseballs (Epstein, 2013).  The cause of this failure was likely 
that MLB batters don’t know how to watch the ball when it is pitched in a sufficiently novel way (for 
them).  Telling these batters to adjust their anticipatory saccades would presumably have done nothing 
to help.  The batters already possessed overwhelming evidence that watching the ball in way w—the 
way that they know how to watch it in baseball—was not an effective way of watching a softball.  Such 
evidence did nothing to stop their continued whiffing.  This suggests that the players’ putative 
unconscious belief that w is a way to watch the ball is insensitive to the evidence, made obvious by 
their continued whiffing, that w is not a way to watch a softball.  What Pujols, Bonds, and Rodriguez 
needed was not a new set of beliefs about the right way to watch the ball.  What they needed was the 
practice required to learn how to hit by watching a softball.  Indeed, the fact that these kinds of skills 
supposedly require about ten thousand hours of rote practice puts additional pressure on the claim 
that knowing how to hit softballs by watching them in the right way is nothing more than a matter of 
acquiring the right beliefs.42   
  To avoid this worry, Intellectualists might turn to a revisionary account of belief, such as the 
theory of “Spinozan Belief Fixation” (Gilbert, 1991; Egan, 2008, 2011; Huebner, 2009; Mandelbaum 
2011, 2014).43  Spinozan Belief Fixation holds that as soon as an idea is presented to the mind, it is 
believed.  In other words, beliefs are unconscious propositional attitudes that are formed automatically 
as soon as an agent registers or tokens their content.  For example, one cannot entertain or consider 
or imagine the proposition that “dogs are made out of paper” without immediately and unavoidably 
believing that dogs are made out of paper (Mandelbaum, 2014).  We refrain from comment on 
Spinozan Belief Fixation, but simply note the obvious: it is a radically revisionary view of belief, and 
we doubt that all Intellectualists will want to be tethered to it.  Indeed, it seems to us that Spinozan 
Belief Fixation is deeply at odds with the frequent claim that Intellectualism does justice to ordinary 
ways of thinking and talking about knowledge-how (in the form of linguistic analysis and surveys of 
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folk judgments).  We cannot see how Intellectualists could maintain this claim if they were to embrace 
a theory like Spinozan Belief Fixation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 We hope to have clarified a key aspect of  the current debate about the nature of  knowledge-
how—namely, the prevalence, plausibility, and import of  no-belief  cases, or cases in which an agent 
appears to know how to φ without believing that w, the way that agent actually φs, is a way for her to 
φ.  We have provided what we think are clearer no-belief  cases than those in the extant literature by 
drawing on studies in the psychology of  skilled motor action.  These cases, we claim, illustrate how 
the debate over the nature of  knowledge-how actually converges with a different debate in 
epistemology regarding the propriety of  attributing beliefs to often conflicted epistemic agents like 
ourselves.   Ultimately, we think that these cases lend limited support to an Anti-Intellectualist account 
of  knowledge-how, according to which knowledge-how is irreducible to knowledge-that.  This sort 
of  picture allows for practical knowledge to deviate from theoretical knowledge in an intuitive way.  
What’s more, this sort of  picture of  practical knowledge fits nicely with the broader view that skill 
and expertise are in some way in tension with—perhaps even threatened by—theoretical knowledge.44   
 At the heart of  the know-how debate, then, stand two competing pictures of  the relationship 
between theoretical and practical knowledge.  On the one hand, Anti-Intellectualists offer a picture 
on which these two sorts of  knowledge very often fail to coincide, on which getting these two sorts 
of  knowledge to align represents a particular, and perhaps unusual, sort of  achievement.  On the other 
hand, Intellectualists offer a picture of  theoretical and practical knowledge on which the former simply 
subsumes the latter.  Intellectualists can and have employed a range of  different tools to make the 
case for this subsumption, from analyses of  the syntax of  natural languages to surveys of  folk 
judgments.  Here we have focused on cases in which at least everyone can agree that theoretical and 
practical knowledge seem to be misaligned, and we have considered those tools Intellectualists have at 
their disposal for trying to explain (away) this seeming.  Focusing on questions about belief-attribution, 
we have argued that the Intellectualist’s subsumption of  practical to theoretical knowledge requires a 
theory of  implicit belief  that both explains the relevant cases and is plausible in its own right.  We 
hope to have shown that, in their current state at least, it is questionable whether any of  the available 
theories of  implicit belief  will prove to be the right tool for the job. 
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